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Abstract
Previous research has demonstrated that people exhibit discounting when presented with
two possible causes of an event. That is, when a moderately effective cause is learned
about in the presence of a highly effective cause, the efficacy of the moderate cause is
underestimated (e.g. Goedert & Spellman, 2005). According to the EXIT model
(Kruschke, 2001), people learn which cues in their environment are relevant and shift
attention away from non-relevant cues; thus, discounting may involve a "learned
inattention." Here, I directly assessed whether forcing individuals to attend to a
candidate cause changes their perceptions regarding the cause's effectiveness.
Participants simultaneously learned about two potential causes of a common outcome:
one moderately effective in producing the outcome (target) and the other either strongly
effective, weakly effective or confounded with the target. During encoding of the
contingency information, I manipulated participants' visual attention by asking them to
perform a secondary peripheral cueing task that directed their attention primarily towards
the left or the right. After encoding the contingency information, participants rated the
effectiveness of each cause on a numeric scale ranging from -100 to +loo. When the
target appeared on the right, discounting disappeared, which suggests that discounting
may be due in part to an a-priori rightward attentional bias. At the same time, increasing
attention to the alternative, confounded cause enhanced participants' propensity to
control for that alternative when judging the effectiveness of the target cause.

Introduction
Everyday, humans are confronted with multiple potential causes of various events.
For example, perhaps you are suffering from a toothache. You decide to take an aspirin
and apply a cold compress. Over time, your toothache subsides. How do you know
whether to athibute the pain relief to the aspirin or the cold compress? Having multiple
potential causes in the environment does not mean that they all produce the outcome, nor
do they have the same predictive strength. In particular, people must account for
potential alternative causes of an outcome in order to discover the true relationship
between a candidate cause and that outcome (Cheng; 1997; Spellman, 1996a; Spellman,
1996b; Ward & Jenkins, 1965). One basic cognitive process that may play an essential
role in causal attribution is how an individual allots attention to potential causes in her
environment. Indeed, changes in the distribution of attention affect the acquisition of
contingencies in basic learning paradigms (Kruschke, 2001; Kruschke, Kappenman&
Hetrick, 2005). What about attention's role in human causal reasoning when we are
confronted with multiple potential causes? The goal of this study is to examine the
hypothesis that preferentially directing an individual's attention to one of two cues during
contingency acquisition will affect that individual's causal inferences.
Causal Inference f r o Contingency Information
Statistical models of causal reasoning claim that a cause's strength can be
determined statistically. For example, in the probabilistic contrast model (Cheng&
Novick, 1990), a person can infer the effectiveness of a cause in producing an outcome
by determining the difference between the probability of the effect when the cause is
present and that when it is absent. A cause is apparent when the P(E) is different in the

presence of the candidate cause than in the absence of the candidate cause. When the
change in probability (AP) is non-zero, there is a covarational relationship (Cheng&
Novick, 1990). This is mathematically defined as follows:

A P = P(E1C) - P(E1-C)
Here, P(E1C) indicates the probability of the effect given the presence of the cause and
P(E1-C) indicates the probability of the effect given the absence of the cause. This model
accounts for generative causes (a positive AP up to I), non-causal event (a AP equal to 0)
as well as inhibitory causes (a negative AP up to -1). For example, if there is a 1.0
probability of effect E in the presence of candidate cause C and a zero chance that effect

E would occur in the absence of the candidate cause, the equation reflects this: AP = 1-0
=

1. To the contrary, if there is a 1.0 probability of effect E in the presence of the

candidate cause and a 1.0 chance that effect E would occur in the absence of the
candidate cause, solving for AP would yield: AP = 1-1 = 0. In this example, no
predictive value is attributable to the candidate cause because the probability of the effect
in the presence and in the absence of the cause is equal. The presence of the candidate
cause does not increase the probability of the effect. If there is a 0 probability of effect E
in the presence of the candidate cause C and a 1.0 chance that effect E would occur in the
absence of the candidate cause, the equation is: AP = 0-1 = -1. Here, the candidate cause
has an inhibitory effect; when the candidate cause is present, the effect is actually less
likely to occur.
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Figure I. Contingency table detailing the occurrences of lung cancer (numerator) out of the population
partaking in smoking andlor coffee drinking behaviors. The marginal totals represent contingencies not
taking the alternative cause into account.

Although calculation of AP yields information about the contingency between a
candidate cause and an effect, correlation does not equal causation. One must control for
alternative potential causes when determining whether the covariational relation is also a
causal one (Cheng, 1997; Spellman, 1996a; Spellman, 1996b; Ward& Jenkins, 1965).
Imagine that a long-term study concluded that drinking coffee increases the likelihood of
lung cancer. This claim does not take into account confounding behaviors. Most
importantly, the study may have ignored whether or not the participants also smoked.
We can utilize this study design to look at different ways to calculate contingency with
multiple potential causes (coffee drinkinglsmoking) of an outcome (lung cancer). Figure
1 depicts a contingency table in which the denominator in each of the ratios represents

the number of individuals who did or did not smoke and who did or did not drink coffee
and the numerator represents the instances of lung cancer in that group. One way of
evaluating the relation between coffee and lung cancer would be to calculate AP for
coffee drinking while ignoring the alternative cause of smoking. In this instance, we
would add across the row for coffee drinkers and non-coffee drinkers to calculate the
marginal totals. This calculation reveals that instances of lung cancer in the coffee
drinking sample is higher (1 5/20) than in the non-coffee drinking sample (5120) AP

=

15120-5120 = 10120 = .5. This AP indicates that drinking coffee has a generative effect.
However, this calculation did not take into account another, confounding variable:
smoking. To control for the alternative potential cause, one can calculate A P for coffee
only across those instances in which the alternative cause is absent. Thus, when people
drink coffee but do not smoke, the instance of lung cancer is 015. When people do not
drink coffee and also do not smoke, the instance of lung cancer is 0115. When controlling
for this confounding variable, AP changes: 015-0115 = 0. Now that the alternative
potential cause is taken into account, the contingency between coffee drinking and lung
cancer is 0. Experimental evidence suggests that people do indeed control for alternative
causes (Spellman, 1996a) and some authors speculate that they do so by focusing on
events in which alternative causes of the outcome are absent (Cheng & Holyoak, 1995;
Melz, Cheng, Holyoak & Waldmann, 1993).
Discounting

Although people control for alternative potential causes, not all observations in
this field conform to statistical models. When participants assess multiple candidate
causes, one phenomenon they demonstrate is discounting. In discounting, when learning
about two potential causes of a common event, the presence of a highly effective cause
often reduces the perceived efficacy of a moderately effective one (Goedert & Spellman,
2005; Baker, et al, 1993; Busemeyer, Myung & McDaniel, 1993). Accounting for a
second, confounding cause may lead a person to reduce their judgments of a moderately
effective target, but such a reduction in the judgments of a moderately effective target
sometimes occur when two causes are not confounded. Figure 2 displays two
contingency tables used in experimental designs to assess discounting (Goedert, Harsch

& Spellman, 2005; Goedert & Spellman, 2005). The target cause in both cases is

moderately effective with a contingency of .33; that is, the cause increases the probability
of the outcome by 33%. Unlike our previous example, these two causes are not
confounded. This means that the AP value when taking the alternative into account
(calculating based on the absence of the alternative cause) and not controlling for the
alternative (using the marginal totals) is the same. Table 1 displays participants' ratings
of the target and alternative in both conditions (Goedert & Spellman, 2005). When
comparing the mean causal ratings of the target between conditions, participants rated the
target as less causal when there was a strong alternative cause present than when there
was a weak alternative cause present. This result is an example of discounting.
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Figure 2. Contingency tables for two conditions; Strong Alternative Independent and Weak Alternative
Independent. In both conditions, the causes are not confounded.

Table 1
Mean ratings and standard errors of the target and alternative causes (Goedert &
Spellman, 2005) in Strong Alternative Independent and Weak Alternative Independent
conditions.
Strong Alternative
Weak Alternative

Target
-2.4 (10.5)
37.2 (9.9)

Alternative
43.8 (7.2)
-45.8 (10.8)

Researchers have offered several different possible reasons why discounting
occurs. Discounting may result from competition among the causes for associative
strength with the outcome (Baker et al, 1993). Some assert that people discount because
a secondary cause does not fit into a previously formulated explanation of a first cause
and therefore they discount the effectiveness of the second cause (Ahn & Gordon, 1994).
Perhaps discounting is due to a general cognitive comparison (Goedert & Spellman,
2005). Simply by having a highly effective cause present, the moderately effective cause
is perceived to be less causal by comparison (Vallei-Tourangeau, Baker & Mercier,
1994). Another plausible reason for discounting is that if one strong cause is present,
there is a belief that it is unlikely for there to be another strong cause present, so the
moderate cause is discounted (Morris& Lanick, 1995; Goedert & Spellman, 2005). If
discounting is the product of the learning process, one possible factor in this process is
attention. As people learn about two potential causes of the same outcome, there may be
systematic shifts in attention between the causes (Kruschke, 2001). These attentional
shifts may affect causal judgments. In accordance with this, discounting would involve
"learned inattention."
Learned Inattention

According to Kruschke's (2001) EXIT model, by virtue of comparison during the
learning process, there will be shifts of attention to more predictive cues. This model
asserts that "learned inattention" is the mechanism by which these shifts happen
(Kruschke, 2001). Attention is holistic and connected. That is, if attention to one cause
increases, then attention to another, simultaneously presented cause must decrease.
When learning that a single cue is predictive of a single outcome, attention is undivided.

In this instance, all attention is directed towards the single cue-outcome relationship.
When an additional cue is present alongside the original cue, attention is now divided
between the two cues. In this model, the predictive value of the original cue is lower due
to the split attention. To correct this and return attention allocation to its original state,
attention shifts back to the original cue, therefore lowering the attention to the
subsequently learned cue. In this theory, people learn to attend to causes that reduce
interference with already learned knowledge (Kruschke, 2001). Further, when learning
occurs, feedback provides information regarding the cue-outcome relationship. Attention
then shifts away from causal cues that have high associative error and towards causal
cues that reduce error. From this, there can be adjustment for the strength of the
association of attended cues. The goal in the shifting of attention is to reduce attention to
cues that create error.
The experimental research of Kruschke (Kruschke, Kappenman& Hetrick, 2005)
has also demonstrated that people learn to shift attention away from non-relevant cues.
Experimentally, blocking paradigms result in non-relevant cues (Kamin, 1968, 1969). By
using the blocking paradigm, one can assess the attentional diffusion away from the
blocked (non-relevant) cue. In blocking, participants learn that a cue is associated with
an outcome 100% of the time. Then, the original cue and a new cue are presented
simultaneously, with the same outcome. People do not learn to associate the new, second
cue, with the outcome. Thus, learning of the original cue effectively blocks learning the
new cue. In an eyetracking experiment (Kruschke, Kappenman & Hetrick, 2005)
participants were shown two cue words with four option response words. When
participants clicked on a word response, feedback immediately followed regarding

whether or not their response was correct. Through this system of response and feedback,
it is possible to block a word cue. The eyetracking component of this experiment
indicated that participants shifted their visual attention away from blocked cues. This
shift in visual attention may be a reflection of the shift in cognitive attention. Participants
did not attribute causal power to the blocked cue and that manifested in diminished
amount of visual attention to the blocked cue. The EXIT model accounts for this
experimental result and the shifts in attention.
Our own previous research suggests that people tend to shift their visual attention
towards items they believe to be more causal (Czamecki & Goedert, 2008). Kruschke's
study utilized phased blocking, in which words appear in different, distinct phases to
create blocking. The blocked (first solely presented) and unblocked cues do not appear
together until a later phase. Unlike the Kruschke experiment, we did not use a phased
blocking paradigm. Instead, we presented two causes simultaneously and participants
acquired information about each potential cause's contingency at the same time. In that
research, we filmed the eye movements of participants during a causal reasoning task.
Participants who discounted spent more time looking at a target cause when presented
alongside a weak alternative than when the target cause was presented with a strong
alternative. Participants who did not discount showed the opposite pattern. In both cases,
this suggests that people direct a greater proportion of their visual attention towards a cue
perceived to be more causal. Additionally, most participants displayed an overall
rightward attentional bias. Since the visual component of the experiment (computer
screen) took place in far space, this bias is consistent with previous research showing
rightward attentional biases in far space (Vamava, McCarthy& Beumont, 2002). When

the target cause was presented on the right (attentionally biased) side of the screen, most
participants did not discount. When the target cause was presented on the left side of the
screen, all but one participant exhibited discounting. This result indicates that having the
target presented in the biased side of space (thus receiving more visual attention)
mitigated the discounting effect. Perhaps, by manipulating attention on a trial-by-trial
basis, attention can be drawn to one event for a longer proportion of time and similarly
induce changes in causal judgment, namely mitigating discounting.
Experiment Rationale

Kruschke and colleagues (2005) have found that blocking of a redundant cause is
associated with a decrease in overt visual attention to that blocked cause. Similarly, our
previous research indicated that people, when presented with two potential causes, spend
more time looking at what is perceived to be more causal (Czarnecki & Goedert, 2008).
This eyetracking work assessing the relation between visual attention and perceived
causal effectiveness is essentially correlational. It does not tell us whether people spend
less time looking at a potential cause because the person already believes the event to be
ineffective or whether the person believes the cause to be ineffective because she is
spending less time looking at it. In this experiment, I manipulated attention to investigate
the causal direction of this relation. The attentional manipulation involved an adaptation
of a peripheral cueing paradigm (i.e. Posner, 1980; Jonides, 1980). Peripheral cues have
been shown to reduce reaction time to a previously cued spatial location (Lambert, 2000).
Research utilizing attentional cues indicates that additional attentional allotment to a
particular spatial location enhances its processing (e.g. Bashinski & Bacharach, 1980).

Accordingly, I utilize a non-informative peripheral cue in order to force visual attention
to one cause a majority of the time.
In the present study, participants performed a causal reasoning task. Participants
assessed the effectiveness of a moderately effective target cause and an alternative cause
in one of three conditions: strong alternative independent (SA-lnd), strong alternative
confounded (SA-Con), and weak alternative independent (WA-Ind). Participants
simultaneously performed a secondary spatial cueing task in which a non-informative
peripheral cue oriented participants' attention to one candidate cause 75% of the time. I
hypothesize that this induced attention will strengthen the association between that
particular cue-outcome relation. I therefore anticipate seeing a shift in causal judgments
in favor of the cued cause. This enhanced processing may mitigate the discounting effect.
To assess discounting, I compared the numeric ratings of the target in the SA-Ind and
WA-Ind conditions. Typically, discounting is observed when participants rate the target
as less effective in the SA-Ind relative to the WA-Ind condition. To assess controlling for
the alternative, I compared the ratings of the target in the SA-Ind and SA-Con conditions.
Typically, controlling for the alternative is observed when participants rate the target as
less effective in the confounded condition (SA-Con) relative to the independent condition
(SA-Ind). I hypothesized that the attentional cue, when associated with the moderate
cause, would eliminate the difference in participants' rating between the SA-Ind and
WA-Ind conditions, thereby, eliminating discounting. It is more difficult to anticipate the
role of the attentional cue on accounting for the confounded cause. Perhaps increasing
attention towards the moderate target in the strong altemative confounded cause will
disrupt the participants' ability to account for the alternative cause. If this were the case,

I would anticipate increased attention to the target to increase the rating of the target in
the SA-Con condition and eliminate the difference between SA-Con and SA-Ind target
ratings.
Method
Participants

Two hundred and thirty two undergraduate students from the Psychology
Department participant pool at Seton Hall University participated in partial fulfillment of
course requirement. All participants had normal or corrected to-normal vision.
Design

The experiment was a 3 x 2 between subjects design with strength of the alternative
cause (strong alternative independent [SA-Ind], strong alternative confounded [SA-Con],
weak alternative independent [WA-Ind]) and asterisk location (75% left vs. 75% right) as
factors. The side of the screen on which the alternative appeared was counterbalanced
between participants. The strength of the alternative cause was manipulated by changing
the frequency with which the outcome occurred across the different cause combinations
(see Figures 3a-3c for contingency tables representing one block of each condition). The
primary dependent variable was the perceived effectiveness of each of the two causes, as
assessed by a numeric ratings scale from -100 to +loo.
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Figure 3. Contingency tables of the three conditions in this experiment. In all conditions, the
target is held constant at .33. The causes in the SA-Ind and WA-Ind conditions are not
confounded.

The target had a contingency of .33 across the SA-Ind and WA-Ind conditions.
In the SA-Ind condition, the alternative cause had a contingency of .67. In the WA-Ind
condition, the alternative cause had a contingency of .OO. In the confounded condition,
the target had a conditional contingency of -0.20 and an unconditional contingency of .33.
In the confounded condition, the strong alternative had a AP = .8 when the target was
controlled for but a A P = .67 if the target was not controlled for.
Participants' attention was directed primarily to the left or right side of the screen
by the asterisk (spatial cue), which either appeared on the right 75% of the time and the
left 25% of the time, or vice versa (75% of the time and right 25% of the time). The

location of the asterisk was probabilistic rather than deterministic (i.e., the location of the
was not completely predictable) so that participants continued to attend to it rather than
automatically responding with the location of the asterisk.
Materials & Procedure

Participants tested in small groups of up to four. They first read and signed the
informed consent agreement. The remainder of the task (i.e., cover story, directions and
stimuli) was delivered on a PC using E-Prime. Participants also read a cover story that
explained that they were to rate the effectiveness of several colored liquids in either
making plants bloom or in preventing plant blooming. Specifically, the task consisted of
viewing pairs of colored liquids poured in different combinations on a plant without a
bloom (see Appendix A for a sample stimulus). Participants performed two blocks of 36
prediction trials each and made numeric causal judgments after each block. Each trial
represented one occurrence in the contingency table (Figures 3a-3c). Within a block, the
trials were presented in a pseudo-random order. When a trial appeared, the participants
first responded to the asterisk location. The participant pressed the "L" key if the asterisk
appeared on the left side of the screen or pressed the " R key if the asterisk appeared on
the right side of the screen. Next, the participant pressed the "Y" key if she thought the
plant would bloom and the " N key if she thought the plant would not bloom. After the
participant entered her prediction, a results screen appeared for 2500ms with feedback
regarding whether or not the plant actually bloomed. The asterisk appeared for the
duration of the prediction screen, but terminated when the feedback screen appeared.
After each block of 36 trials, the participants gave a numeric rating ranging from -100 to
100 for each liquid. Negative one hundred meant the liquid would completely inhibit

plant blooming. Positive one hundred meant the liquid was a complete plant fertilizer.
Zero meant the liquid had no effect; the plant would bloom regardless of the use of the
liquid.
Results
Table 2
Appearance of discounting or accounting for an alternative confounded cause based on
target side and cue location for target ratings (a) and trial-by-trial predictions (b).
Target on Left
Target Cued
Alternative Cued

Discounting?
Yes
Yes

Accounting for Alternative?
Yes
Yes

Target on Right
Target Cued
Alternative Cued

Discounting?
No
No

Accounting for Alternative?
Yes: Less
Yes: Greater

B
Target on Left
Target Cued
~ltirnativeCued

Discounting?
Yes
Yes

Accounting for Alternative?
No
Yes

Target on Right
Target Cued
Alternative Cued

Discounting?
No
No

Accounting for Alternative?
Yes: Less
Yes: Greater

I used participants' performance on the asterisk location task as a criterion for
inclusion of their data in analyses. Given the simplicity of this task (i.e., reporting the
location, left vs. right, of a visually obvious stimulus), a multitude of errors would
indicate that the participant was not paying attention during the experiment. Participants
with more than three errors in any given block were excluded (n = 12), leaving a total of
220 participants in the study. Tables 2a and 2b reflect observations of discounting and
accounting for the alternative cause as well as the relative magnitude of strength of the

phenomena in the case of an interaction. These tables summate results of causal ratings
(Table 2a) and trial-by-trial predictions (Table 2b) each divided by target side.
All significant results reported here reached an alpha level of p<.O5. Repeated
measures were performed using the MANOVA Pillai's Trace procedure and post-hocs
using the Bonferroni correction.
Causal Ratings of Target

Figure 4 depicts the relation between contingency condition, asterisk location and
target position. Numeric target ratings are the main measure to assess discounting and
accounting for the alternative. As anticipated, participants' causal judgments varied with
the target position and to an extent, the asterisk location. A repeated measures
MANOVA on the target ratings with block (one, two) as a within subjects factor and
contingency (SA-Ind, WA-Ind, SA-Con), asterisk location (left, right), and target position
(left, right) as between-subjects factors revealed main effects of contingency condition,
F(2,219)= 48.9, 17;

= .32,

F(1, 219) = 8.2, 17:

= .038,

target position, F(1,219)=48.2, 17;

= .19, and

asterisk location,

as well as a three-way target position by asterisk location by

contingency condition interaction, F(2,4) = 6.5, 17;

= .06.

Post-hoc analysis revealed

that mean ratings (across all target positions and asterisk locations) were statistically
higher in the SA-Ind condition (M= 38.02, SE = 3.9) than in the SA-Con condition (M=
-12.86, SE = 3.99), which indicates that overall, participants accounted for the alternative
cause. Mean ratings were directionally higher in the SA-Ind condition (M = 38.02, SE =
3.99) than in the WA-Ind condition (M= 31.79, SE = 4), a pattern opposite that of
discounting. On average, ratings of the target were higher when the asterisk appeared on
the right (M= 25.53, SE = 3.30) than on the left (M= 12.52, SE = 3.16). On average,

ratings of the target were higher when the target appeared on the right (M= 34.85, SE =

3.21) than on the left (M= 3.1 1 , SE = 3.26). However, the three-way interaction tempers
the interpretation of these main effects (Figure 4).
Target on LeR

Target on Right

Figure 4. Average causal ratings of the target as a function of target side, contingency condition and asterisk
location, averaged across blocks.

Effect of Target Side on Target Rating
The three-way interaction indicates that, across blocks, the effects of the asterisk
location and contingency condition differed depending on whether the target appeared on
the left or right (Figure 4). When the target appeared on the left side of the computer
screen, participants both discounted and accounted for the alternative regardless of
whether or not the target was cued. The asterisk location by contingency condition
univariate ANOVA revealed a main effect of contingency condition, F(2, 109) = 31, 17:
= .38, and

no other effects. Participants rated the target as less causal in the SA-Ind

condition (M= -8.9, SE = 6.14) than in the WA-Ind condition (M= 41.2, SE = 6.39),
indicating discounting. Demonstrating accounting for the alternative, the mean target
ratings in the SA-Ind condition (M= -8.9, SE = 6.14) were higher than that in the SACon condition (M= -25.6, SE = 6.3).

When the target was on the right, the asterisk by contingency ANOVA revealed
main effects of contingency condition, F(2, 109) = 79.5,

F(1, 109) = 15.4,
12.19,

$, = .19.

v:

= .13, as well

71i
= .6, and asterisk location,

as a contingency by asterisk interaction, F(2, 109) =

Consistent with the previously observed phenomenon (Czarnecki &

Goedert, 2008), when the target was on the right side of the computer screen, participants
did not discount. Mean target ratings in the SA-Ind condition ( M = 83.3, SE = 4.79) were
actually higher than those in the WA-Ind condition ( M = 21.37, SE = 4.92). However,
participants still controlled for the alternative cause: mean target ratings in the SA-Ind
condition ( M = 83.3, SE = 4.79) were higher than in the SA-Con condition ( M = -.13, SE
= 4.97).

Again, these main effects are tempered by the significant interaction between

asterisk location and contingency. The simple main effect of contingency condition
revealed that participants did not discount when the asterisk was on the left. Mean target
ratings were significantly higher in the SA-Ind condition ( M = 79.57, SE = 6.79) than in
the WA-Ind condition ( M = 22.63, SE = 6.96). Participants also accounted for the
alternative; mean target ratings were higher in the SA-Ind condition ( M = 79.57, SE =

6.79) than in the SA-Con condition ( M = -30.94, SE = 7.34). When the asterisk was on
the right, participants also did not discount; mean target ratings were higher in the SA-Ind
condition ( M = 87.03, SE = 6.69) than in the WA-Ind condition ( M = 20.12, SE = 6.87).
Participants did account for the alternative; mean target ratings were higher in the SA-Ind
condition ( M = 87.03, SE = 6.69) than in the SA-Con condition ( M = 30.69, SE = 7.03).
Increased attention to the moderate target through a-priori rightward attentional bias
mitigated discounting while increased attention towards the confounded alternative cause

increased accounting for that alternative cause, as shown by the greater difference when
the target was on the right side of the screen, but the asterisk cued left
Causal Ratings of Alternative
Target on Left

Target on Right

ConUnpency CondiUan

Contingency Condition

Figure 5. Average causal ratings of the alternative as a function of target side, contingency condition and
asterisk location, averaged across blocks.

Causal ratings of the alternative are not diagnostic of discounting but are
informative when assessing accounting for a confounding cause. A repeated measures
MANOVA with block (one, two) as the within-groups factor and contingency (SA-Ind,
WA-Ind, SA-Con) asterisk location (left, right) and target position (left, right) as
between-groups factors revealed main effects of contingency condition, F(2,219) = 35.8,
=

.26, target position, F(1,219)

9.2, r$

= .04, as well

= 27.6, 17:=.12, and asterisk location, F(1,219) =

as a three-way contingency condition by target position by asterisk

location interaction, F(2,4) = 5.5, 7:

= .05.

As anticipated, ratings of the alternative

cause also varied with respect to target position and asterisk location. Post-hoc tests
revealed a significant difference between SA-Ind (M = 55.58, SE = 4.62) and WA-Ind (M
= 4.79,

SE = 4.66) conditions, reflecting the relationship between the strong and weak

alternatives. There was, however, no overall difference in participants' ratings of the
target in the SA-Ind (M = 55.58, SE = 4.62) and SA-Con (M= 49.89, SE = 4.65)

conditions, suggesting that overall they did not control for the target in their judgments of
the alternative. Once again, the three-way interaction (Figure 5) indicates that the effects
of asterisk location and contingency condition depended upon the target's location.
When the target appeared on the left, hence the alternative was on the right (i.e.,
a-priori biased) side of the screen, participants demonstrated sensitivity to the different
strengths of that alternative cause but overall they did not control for the target cause
when rating the alternative. The asterisk location by contingency condition ANOVA on
the causal ratings of the alternative revealed a main effect of contingency, F(2, 109) =
69.67, rl:
= .57 and no other effects. Demonstrating sensitivity to the contingencies,
participants rated the alternative as more causal in the SA-Ind condition (M= 86.56, SE =
5.56) than mean target ratings in the WA-Ind condition (M= -3.17, SE = 5.78). But,
overall their mean alternative ratings in the SA-Ind condition (M= 86.56, SE = 5.56)
were higher than those in the SA-Con condition (M= 69.68, SE = 5.7), a pattern opposite
that expected were participants controlling for the target in their ratings of the alternative.
When the target was presented on the right side, hence the alternative was on the
left (i.e., relatively unattended side), the asterisk location by contingency ANOVA
revealed a main effect of asterisk location, F(2, 109) = 8.6,

rli

=

.08, as well as a

contingency condition by asterisk location interaction, F(2, 109) = 7.6,

v:

=

.13. The

main effect of asterisk location is due to the fact that overall, participants gave higher
ratings to the alternative when the asterisk was on the left (M= 35.57, SE = 5.74) than
when the asterisk was on the right (M = 11.11, SE = 6.05). To follow up on the asterisk
location by contingency condition interaction, simple main effects tests were conduced
for when the asterisk appeared on the left side of the screen (i.e., cued the target) and

when it appeared on the right side of the side of the screen (i.e., cued the alternative).
When the asterisk appeared on the right side of the screen, mean alternative ratings in the
SA-Ind condition (M = 3 1.47, SE = 11.56) were higher than mean target ratings in the
WA-Ind condition ( M = 6.09, SE = 10.22) showing a reflection of the actual nature of
alternative strength. When the asterisk did not cue the alternative, mean alternative
ratings in the SA-Ind condition (M = 3 1.47, SE = 11.53) were higher than mean
altemative ratings in the SA-Con condition ( M = -4.22, SE = 9.93) indicating not
accounting for the alternative cause. When the asterisk was on the lefi, mean alternative
ratings in the SA-Ind condition ( M = 22.91, SE = 9.96) were higher than in the WA-Ind
condition ( M = 19.4, SE = 10.21) once again reflecting the relative strength of the
alternative. When the asterisk cued the alternative, mean alternative ratings in the SAInd condition ( M = 22.91, SE = 9.96) were lower than in the SA-Con condition ( M =
64.42, SE = 10.76) indicating accounting for the alternative confounded cause. When the
confounded altemative was cued, participants' causal judgments more closely showed
accounting for the confounded cause. Generally, this pattern of results is complimentary
to the previously reported target ratings, showing the same effect of target and asterisk.
Trial-by-trialanalyses
Target on Left

Target Rlght

Figure 6. Probability of a "yes" shown across blocks for each contingency condition

Because it is participants' responses to the target cause that are essential to the
assessment of discounting and accounting for the alternative, I present the analysis of the
trial-by-trial predictions for the target-only trials (but not for other trial types). Analyses
of the proportion of "yes" responses that participants gave on the target only trials yielded
patterns similar to their causal ratings of the target.
A repeated measures MANOVA with block (one, two) as the within-subjects
factor and contingency (SA-Ind, WA-Ind, SA-Con), asterisk location (left, right) and
target position (left, right) as between-subjects factors revealed main effects of
contingency condition, F(2,219) = 41.9,

v:

= .12,

vi

= .32, and

target position, F(1,219) = 23,

an asterisk location by target position by contingency condition interaction, F(2,

4) = 3.7, r12= .04, and a block by target position by contingency condition interaction, F(2,
4) = 4.5,

r7i .05. Participants' trial-by-trial predictions varied with the target position
=

and asterisk location. Although the proportion of "yes" responses were directionally
lower in the SA-Ind condition (M = .62, SE = .03) than in the WA-Ind condition (M= .68,
SE = .02), this difference was not significant: therefore, participants did not discount in
their trial-by-trial prediction on the target-only trials. They did, however demonstrate
accounting for the alternative: the mean proportion of "yes" responses were higher in the
SA-Ind condition (M= .62, SE = .03) than in the SA-Con condition (M= .3, SE = .04)
indicating a pattern consistent with accounting for the alternative cause. Once again,
these interpretations are tempered by the three-way interactions.
Following up the block by contingency condition by target position interaction
(Figure 6), a univariate ANOVA revealed a main effect of contingency condition, F(2,
109) = 43.5, 11:

= .45, and a block by

contingency condition interaction, F(2, 109) = 7.8,

$ = .I3 when the target was on the left.

Predictions in each condition were different

across blocks depending upon whether the target was presented on the right side of the
screen or the left side of the screen. When the target was presented on the left side of the
computer screen, mean prediction probability in the SA-Ind condition ( M =.34, SE = .04)
was lower than in the WA-Ind condition ( M =.76, SE = .04), indicating a pattern
consistent with discounting. Mean probability of a yes response in the SA-Ind condition

( M =.34, SE = .04) was equal to the mean probability in the SA-Con condition (M= .3 1,
SE = .04), indicating not accounting for the confounding cause. When the target was on
the right, ANOVA revealed a main effect of contingency condition, F(2,109) = 45.7, 71:
= .45, and a block by

contingency condition interaction, F(2,109) = 3.9, 1:

= .07.

Similar to the numeric ratings of the target, when the target was presented on the right,
mean prediction probability in the SA-Ind condition ( M =3 8 , SE = .04) was higher than
in the WA-Ind condition ( M =.60, SE = .04), indicating a pattern opposite that of
discounting. Mean probability of a yes response in the SA-Ind condition ( M =3 8 , SE
= .04) was higher than the mean probability in the

SA-Con condition ( M =.39, SE = .04),

indicating accounting for the confounding cause.
Once again, the interactions necessitate simple main effects to assess the impact
of target location on block. When the target was on the left, target ratings in the SA-Ind

and SA-Con conditions decreased across blocks. In block one, when the target was on
the left, mean probability in the SA-Ind condition ( M =.36, SE = .04) was lower than the
WA-Ind condition ( M =.71, SE = .05), indicating discounting. The mean probability in
the SA-Ind condition ( M =.36, SE = .04) was equal to that in the SA-Con condition (M
= .4, SE = .05),

indicating not accounting for the alternative cause. In block two, when

the target was on the left, the mean probability in the SA-Ind (M = .32, SE = .04)
condition was lower than the WA-Ind condition ( M = .SO, SE = .04), indicating
discounting. Unlike block one, the mean probability in the SA-Ind ( M = .32, SE = .04)
condition was directionally higher than that in the SA-Con condition (M = .23, SE = .04),
indicating accounting for the alternative cause. When the target was on the right, the
differences between contingencies were greater in block two than in block one. Simple
main effect of contingency in block one show mean prediction probability in the SA-Ind
condition ( M = .84, SE = .04) was higher than in the WA-Ind condition (M = .60, SE
= .04),

indicating a pattern opposite that of discounting. Mean probability of a yes

response in the SA-Ind ( M = 34, SE = .04) condition was higher to the mean probability
in the SA-Con condition ( M = .44, SE = .04), indicating accounting for the confounding
cause. When the target was on the left, accounting for the alternative developed in block
two. When the target was on the right, the differences between contingency conditions,
not discounting, but accounting for the altemative, became greater.
Following up on the target position by asterisk location by contingency condition
interaction (Figure 7), similar to the ratings of the target, discounting occurred when the
target was presented on the left side of the screen, but not when it was presented on the
right side of the screen. Accounting for the altemative was greater when the target was
presented on the right side of the screen and the asterisk cued the altemative. When the
target was on the left, there was a main effect of contingency, F(2, 109) = 46.3,

$ = .47

and no other effects. Mean prediction probability in the SA-Ind condition ( M = .34 SE
= .04) was

lower than in the WA-Ind condition (M = .76 SE = .04), indicating discounting,

Mean probability of a yes response in the SA-Ind condition ( M = .34 SE = .04) was equal

to the mean probability in the SA-Con condition (M= .30, SE = .04), indicating not
accounting for the confounding cause. When the target was on the right, there were main
effects of contingency, F(2, 109) = 57.32,
qi

= .04 and

7:

= .17.

7z

= .51, asterisk location, F(2,

109) = 4.6,

a contingency condition by asterisk location interaction, F(2, 109) = 10.9,

The main effect of asterisk was due to the asterisk presented on the right side

of the screen having higher mean probability (M= .66, SD = .03) than when the asterisk
was on the left side (M= .58, SD = .03). Running simple main effect of contingency
condition for each asterisk location revealed that when the asterisk was on the left (cueing
the alternative cause), mean prediction probability in the SA-Ind condition (M= .87 SE
= .04) was higher

than in the WA-Ind condition (M= .65, SE = .05), indicating no

discounting. Mean probability of a yes response in the SA-Ind condition (M= $7 SE
= .04) was higher than the mean probability in the

SA-Con condition (M= .22 SE = .05),

indicating accounting for the confounding cause. When the asterisk was on the right
(cueing the target), the simple main effect of contingency condition shows mean
prediction probability in the SA-Ind condition (M= 39, SE = .05) was higher than in the
WA-Ind condition (M = .55, SE = .05), indicating no discounting. Mean probability of a
yes response in the SA-Ind condition (M= 39, SE = .05) was higher than the mean
probability in the SA-Con condition (M= .55, SE = .05), indicating accounting for the
confounding cause. Generally, the pattern of response in trial-by-trial predictions are
similar to the target ratings reported earlier. A pattern similar to discounting occurred
when the target was presented on the left side of the screen, but not when the target was
presented on the right side of the screen. When the target was presented on the left side
of the screen, participants did not account for the confounded cause in their predictions.

When the target was on the right, participants did not discount and accounted for the
confounded alternative regardless of asterisk location, although the difference between
the SA-Ind and SA-Con conditions was greater when the asterisk cued the alternative
cause.
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Figure 7. Probability of a "yes" response as a function of target side and asterisk location, averaged across block.

DISCUSSION
The goal of the current experiment was to determine whether manipulating
participants' lateral distribution of attention using a peripheral cue would influence their
discounting and accounting for an alternative, confounded cause. I hypothesized that
increased attention to a moderate target would mitigate discounting and disrupt
accounting for a confounded cause. Increased attention came in the form of a noninformative peripheral cue as well as a-priori rightward attentional bias. The results on
discounting are consistent with my hypothesis. However, my hypothesis on accounting
for an alternative cause was not completely accurate. I hypothesized that increased
attention towards the moderate target would result in disruption of accounting for the
alternative cause. Accounting for a confounded alternative was not disrupted through
attention to the target, but increased attention towards the alternative enhanced the

accounting for that confounded alternative. In terms of target ratings, when the moderate
target was on the left side of the screen, participants displayed discounting and
accounting for an alternative, confounded cause. When the moderate target was on the
right side of the screen, as predicted, participants did not display discounting. In fact, this
effect appears to be the opposite of discounting, which from here will be referred to as
"anti-discounting". When the target was on the right, participants showed accounting for
the alternative cause. The attentional cue had different effects dependent upon if the
target was on the left or right. When the target was on the right with a cued alternative,
participants showed a greater amount of accounting for the confounded alternative.
Overall, increasing attention towards a moderately effective target cause (here, mainly
through a-priori rightward attentional bias) reduced or reversed discounting and increased
the ability of the cue to enhance processing of the confounded alternative. The numeric
ratings of the target are the primary dependant variable, but numeric ratings of the
alternative and trial-by-trial predictions reveal a similar pattern of results, adding to the
efficacy of the attentional effects on causal judgments.
This current data replicates our previous findings that a target appearing in the
attentionally biased side of space (i.e., the right) mitigates discounting (Czarnecki &
Goedert, 2008). Previous research on near (i.e., peri-personal space, within hand's reach)
and far space (i.e., extra-personal, outside of hand's reach) indicates that there is an apriori rightward attentional bias when stimuli appear in far space (Varnava, McCarthy &
Beaumont, 2002). This rightward bias may be due to a lateralization of neural coordinate systems; each system has different mechanisms dependent upon the distance of
stimuli and the bias may come from the strength of hemispheric activation (Varnava,

McCarthy & Beaumont, 2002). In the current experiment, the stimuli appeared in far
space, and it is therefore possible to attribute the difference in lefbright judgments to
increased attention through this a-priori bias.
Since discounting and accounting for the alternative are dissociable cognitive
processes (Goedert, Harsch & Spellman, 2005), lateralized attentional orientation may
recruit proper or improper systems for these tasks. Similarly, other researchers have also
begun to question the interaction between cognitive tasks and attentional biases after
noting the impact of stimuli in near versus far space on spatial perceptions (Heilman,
Chatterjee & Doty, 1995). In research involving callosotomy patients, Roser and
colleagues presented physically causal (i.e., a ball hit another ball and caused it to move)
and inferred causes (i.e., participant needed to make inferences to determine causality) to
different visual fields to assess the importance of each hemisphere in determining
causality (Roser, Fugelsang, Dunbar, Corballis& Gazzaniga, 2005). Results from this
study indicate that the right hemisphere is critical in physical causality involving moving
stimuli and the left hemisphere is important in infemng contingencies. The implication
of the left hemisphere is important not only in the current task, since participants are
infemng contingencies, but also in the rightward attentional bias. The activation of the
left hemisphere in this task may be a reason for the bias. As previously described,
researchers have observed rightward attentional bias in far space, but leftward attentional
biases in near space. One might then, expect the effects observed here to reverse when
the stimuli presented in near space.
The attentional effects of "anti-discounting" when the target was cued and
enhanced accounting for the confounded cause when the alternative was cued may be

beneficial. Since discounting involves lowered judgments of a moderate target, increased
attention towards the moderate target may increase processing and thus coax causal
perceptions away from a non-advantageous misjudgment. Accounting for an alternative,
confounded cause is a beneficial judgment and increased attention to the alternative cause
would be a further enhancement. Perhaps this is a more stable effect and less likely to be
disrupted by moderate attentional shifts to the target. In both cases, the increased
attention (to the target in discounting and to the confounded alternative when accounting
for it) resulted in judgments that were more accurate, compared to true contingencies.
These findings may also further explain the nature of the discounting effect. The
fact that the target's location (right vs. left) influenced discounting may be the reason
why discounting is traditionally a small effect when the location of the target is
counterbalanced within participants. The "anti-discounting" when target is presented on
the right may water down the overall effect. Attention may prove to be a promising
approach to understanding nonnormative causal perceptions such as discounting. Since
here, an attentional manipulation and a-priori attentional bias have been shown to affect
judgments of causality, the attentional approach may be informative in understanding
phenomena that do not conform to current statistical predictions.
These results are indicative as to the directional nature of the visual attentioncausal reasoning relation; increased visual attention towards a moderate target disrupted
discounting and increased attention towards an alternative cause enhanced the accounting
of that confounded alternative. In Kruschke's EXIT model (2001), visual attention
decreases when learning reveals a cause to be ineffective or non-relevant. Perhaps the
converse is also true, increased (or decreased) attention to one cause may induce the

judgments of causality, a hypothesis supported by the current data. With these results,
we are closer to assessing the directional impact in the relationship between causal
reasoning and visual attention. With previous work integrating information such as
feedback into the causal network, there must now be a model of causal reasoning
including not only visual feedback, but also accounting for this newly found role of
visual attention. However, more experimentation is necessary to determine this. This
integration will be of great assistance in managing and continue to assess current models,
such as the EXIT model.

. These findings are useful in assessing the impact of attention on discounting,
but it does not explain why discounting occurs. Visual attention may influence causal
judgments, but this does not necessarily discredit any of the previously mentioned
hypotheses of why discounting occurs. There may be competition between causes for
associative strength (Baker et al, 1993) and attention could further increase associative
weight for one cause. Increased attention towards one cause means lowered attention
towards the competing cause. This may serve to influence the associative strength
between each cause, thus increasing the perceived associative strength of one competing
cause over the other. This current research seems to fit plausibly with Baker's hypothesis.
Discounting may be a general cognitive comparison in that having something highly
causal discounts something moderately causal (Goedert & Spellman, 2005; ValleiTourangeau, Baker & Mercier, 1994). Furthermore, biased attention could increase the
inspection of the more causal cue thus increasing its mental representation, changing the
perceived cognitive comparison to facilitate discounting. While the previous
explanations sound plausible within the framework of attention, the current findings do

make some explanations seem less likely. For instance, some assert that a secondary
cause does not fit into a previously formulated explanation of a first cause and therefore
discount the effectiveness of the second cause (Ahn & Gordon, 1994). It is unlikely that
attention would influence the results while working within this supposition. Attention
most likely would not influence a judgment formed to support a previously formed
explanation. Another less likely explanation in terms of the present findings is that if one
strong cause is present, it is unlikely that another strong cause would also be present
(Morris& Larrick, 1995; Goedert& Spellman, 2005). Attention seems unlikely to sway a
previously formed belief on the frequency of strong causes. Once again, the present
experiment does not discredit these hypotheses, but some seem more plausible in terms of
this attentional hypothesis. There must be further research to find the cause of
discounting.
Although there was a statistically significant effect of asterisk location, this
manipulation was seemingly unable to overcome a-priori attentional bias. Further
research increasing the attentional strength of cue will more closely investigate the
experimental hypothesis. That is, an attentional cue that beyond a-priori bias orients
attention would presumably replicate these results on both sides of the screen,
irrespective of target location. This would give a more precise indication that
manipulated attention towards a moderate target disrupts discounting and increased
attention towards a confounded alternative enhances accounting of that alternative. The
current data provides promising evidence that further attentional manipulation may
provide these results. In this study, there was no way to ensure (i.e. no eye-tracking data)
that people were orienting attention to the cued cause. If collected, this data would be

further evidence pointing to the impact of manipulated visual attention. Even if
participants successfully responded to which side the cue (asterisk) was on, it is unknown
what proportion of time was fixated on the cued cause. Although the effect of asterisk
location in the trial-by-trial data indicates that participants were using the asterisk,
subsequent studies should utilize eye-tracking procedures to ensure attention towards the
cued cause as anticipated.
In the context of day-to-day life, findings of this nature indicate that attending to
one cause over another may influence our judgments. From our first example, perhaps
we believe that the cold pack alleviated our toothache more effectively than the aspirin
because we spend more time attending to the cold pack than the aspirin. In this example,
attention may be ovemding, to some degree, causal reasoning. Conceivably, attention
may even increase the effectiveness of causal reasoning. Overall, increased attention
towards a moderate target not only mitigated discounting, but resulted in "antidiscounting". Increased attention towards a confounded alternative increased participants
accounting for that confound. This experiment increased attention towards moderate
targets and confounded alternatives and in both cases, attention had the capacity of
maximizing the outcome compared to actual contingencies.
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Appendix A: Sample stimuli with asterisk placement for attentional cueing

BROWN
LIQUID

PURPLE
LIQUID

